

SETTING ORUZGAN'S VIOLENT STAGE

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About Tribal Analysis Center

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The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the number of prior conflicts fought in the name of the same ethnic group.¹

Historically, there have been two opposing political and societal forces functioning in Afghanistan, the “urban modernists” seeking to create a modern nation-state and the “rural traditionalists” who prefer to avoid central control in order to maintain their tribal forms of government. The divide between these two approaches of governance has been the primary force driving the long-running conflict in Afghanistan since 1947. The tribal leaders know that in order for the urban modernists to succeed, the rural ethnic groups and their constituent tribes must fail in their efforts to maintain traditional forms of governance. This broad and deep fault line is ancient and was likely in place well before Ahmad Shah Durrani was able to unify the southern Pashtun tribes to take control of Afghanistan.

The separation between the two groups has existed primarily because of the type of governance that is viewed as acceptable by the various ethnic groups. In the case of Afghanistan's numerous ethnic groups, nearly all of them tend to accept a “top-down” form of leadership, normally in the form of a powerful leader and his extended family that supports him. This is the case of the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Baluch, Hazaras, Pashai, and Brahui. A leadership hierarchy is also generally acceptable to many Pashtuns, especially those identified as “qalang” by the knowledgeable Akbar S. Ahmed.

Ahmad accurately describes two forms of Pashtuns and his description tends to show the results of a gradual evolution from nomadic groups that are in a continuing process of settling into fixed communities. His “qalang” description fits the settled “urban modernists” represented today by Hamid Karzai and in the past by a series of deceased leaders, Daud, Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah who tried to impose their centralized view of Afghanistan upon the traditionalists identified by Ahmed as “nang.” The conflict is intensified with the fact of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups being far more “qalang” than “nang” and generally allied with the “centralizers.”

Generally, Ahmad defines “nang” – honor² – tribes as an egalitarian society characterized by three critical variables not seen in other groups: a low material standard of living, absence of political authority, and a rigid adherence to customary laws. “Qalang” groups are settled, pay taxes, “qalang,” and represent a hierarchal society differing from their nang cousins by having centralized political authority, a complex and prosperous economic life, and an impersonal legal system.³ This concept and the development of the urban vs. rural split within Afghanistan's Pashtun society

1. This very interesting theorem comes from Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis”, *World Politics* 62, No.1, (January 2010) 87-119. The quote appears on pg. 97.

2. Within the Pashtun culture, “honor” is actually better defined as “face,” a form of personal honor in which revenge is required for a loss of face. This is entirely different than the western concept of “honor.”

3. See Ahmad, Akbas S., *Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society*, London: Boston and Henley, 1980, for a full discussion of the Nang vs. qalang concept.

provide some very useful insights into the violent nature of Oruzgan Province.⁴ Nang describes the tribal nature of Afghanistan's mountain Pashtuns and qalang's description fits the settled Pashtuns very well – and Oruzgan Province is a location where Pashtun settled groups were a distinct minority with the Shiite Hazaras in a majority. The nang Pashtuns, however, had little land of their own and were soon to remedy that situation at the expense of the Hazaras.

The purpose of this paper is to show the connection between the suffering of the Hazaras of central Afghanistan and the waves of invading Pashtuns who raided, looted, killed, and enslaved their way to gaining control of southern Oruzgan Province. The unending tension and occasional conflict, particularly in the transition zones between Pashtun and Hazara territories, combined with understanding that nang groups did much of the raiding explains a great deal about the animosity between the two ethnic groups. The relationship of the two large Hazara political groupings may be explained by the decisions made by their leaders in the 1880's when Abdur Rahman declared the Hazaras kafirs, or infidels. Generally, two Hazara "clusters" formed, one supporting Abdur Rahman and the other joined in the rebellion. Again, in general, two large Hazara political groups exist today and their separation may have their roots in the 1880's when one group supported Abdur Rahman's goals while the other Hazaras formed a violent opposition to Afghanistan's central government. While a great deal additional research into archives that don't exist is needed, there are general indications that Karim Khalili's powerbase in the vicinity of Wardak Province may have been the descendents of Hazaras who managed to avoid destruction or exile by accommodating with Abdur Rahman's wishes. Mohammad Mohaqeq's Hazara supporters from north central Afghanistan are probably the descendents of Hazara exiles who were allowed to return and were provided land grants. History from a century and a half ago may also help explain the animosity the Hazaras of today's Daikundi Province feel toward their former governor, Popalzai Durrani Pashtun Jan Mohammad Khan, a nang Pashtun whose clan or family was probably among the Pashtun groups that were involved in the ethnic cleansing of their ancestors when Pashtuns invaded Oruzgan.

Words tell us a lot, especially if we take the time to listen carefully. In many cases, the history of origins of a place name can tell us a lot about its history and in the case of Afghanistan's Oruzgan Province, its' very name explains a great deal about the reasons that the area is so unstable and violent. Its lowermost districts were once the southern boundary of the region called the Hazarajat, or the region of Afghanistan inhabited by the Hazaras. More importantly, these districts were inhabited by a Hazara tribe whose name lingers where they are no longer found in significant numbers because the Oruzgani Hazaras were forced into migrations to Persia's Mashed and British India's Quetta after daring to resist the control imposed upon them by Abur Rahman Khan, Afghanistan's "Iron Amir". The Hazara tribe located to the northeast of the Oruzgani, the Jaghuri, was also active in the revolt against the Iron Amir and those Hazara survivors who couldn't escape were captured for the auction block while their wives and daughters were often relegated to the harems of Abdur Rahman's Pashtun generals and supporters.

Abdur Rahman was determined to create a modern nation-state to be governed from Kabul. In order to accomplish this goal, the various tribes and ethnic groups had to be subjugated. Once he gained control over his own people, the Pashtuns, he planned to use them to dominate the remainder of Afghanistan's ethnic groups. According to Niamanullah Ibrahim:

“In return for conceding the foreign affairs of the country to the British Empire, the Amir gained a great level of autonomy and significant British subsidies for the running of domestic affairs and strengthening of state institutions. Under an agreement with British India he vowed not to establish any diplomatic relationship with any other power and that his external affairs would be managed through British

4. Most of the available literature uses the term "Uruzgan," but this paper will rely on the "Oruzgan" rendering to remain consistent with the terminology used within the Australian and American governments.

channels. As such, he embarked on an ambitious plan of creating a state by building modern institutions and expanding his control over the previously semi-autonomous regions of the country. “

“However, the process of expansion and consolidation of state control over these regions resulted in extensive military confrontation with several regional, tribal and ethnic groups that refused to concede their traditional autonomy to the state. During the 1880s the process resulted in several military confrontations with local Pashtuns in the south and east of the country. The Amir broke the resistance of several tribal groups and local influential persons who defied his authority. He managed to subjugate all Pashtun tribes through several military and political campaigns that heavily relied on the ruthless use of force and the manipulation of local tribal and personal rivalries. Having successfully crushed tribal and personal foes among the Pashtuns, the Amir focused his attention on the other ethnic groups, confronting the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkomans. However, this expansion of the war went through a dramatic change. Through this, the Amir mobilised tribal warriors and religious zealots of all Pashtun tribes so that they would fight the other groups on behalf of the state.”⁵

Adding to the ethnic and tribal complexity of Afghanistan, the military and political competition between Czarist Russia expanding eastward and Victorian Britain as it sought to shield India from the Russian approach led to the emergence of the “Great Game.” This led to increased British activity in Afghanistan. Wars were fought, Kabul was occupied and weak leaders were placed on its throne and were subsequently replaced with powerful monarchs as the British withdrew. This process led to Shah Shujah being replaced by Dost Mohammad and Abdur Rahman later assuming power in 1880.⁶ A powerful ruler was on Kabul’s throne and he gradually set about to create a more modern state, complete with an army capable of controlling his subjects.

The problem of building a nation-state from tribal societies quickly became apparent to Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747 as he started to win an empire that contained multiple ethnic groups that were generally connected to related groups on Afghanistan’s borders, spoke approximately twenty separate languages, worshipped Islam in at least three separate – and antagonistic – ways, and were composed of both settled and nomadic groups that were antagonistic toward one another.⁷ Added to the difficulty of controlling the Durrani Pashtuns found in ruling this unruly region, there was nearly constant animosity between the royal lineages from two different Durrani tribes, the Popalzai and Barakzai, as they competed for control of the throne in Kabul. The Popalzai under Ahmad Shah Durrani ordered that the huge Barakzai tribe be weakened by splitting this powerful tribe into two separate tribes creating the Achakzai tribe in the process, but this effort to weaken their potential tribal opponents did little more than delay the inevitable. By 1835, the khan khel⁸ of the Barakzai tribe, the Mohammadzai, had taken control of the monarchy and held it until 1973.

All of the Afghan rulers before Abdur Rahman attempted to bring the Hazaras under their control. Ahmad Shah Durrani forced the Mohammad Khwaja and Jaghatu Hazaras under central control and the Behsud Hazaras southwest of Kabul soon followed suit. The Sheikh Ali, Dai Zangi, Dai

5. Ibrahim, Niamatullah, *Divide and Rule: State Penetration in Hazarajat (Afghanistan) from the Monarchy to the Taliban*, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Papers Series 42, London, January 2009.

6. Thomas Barfield first identified the connection of weak leaders during British periods of intervention who were replaced with powerful monarchs as the British withdrew from Afghanistan.

7. Hussain, Mohammad, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: A Study of Ethnic Relations*, Thesis, McGill University, 2003, pp. 6-7.

8. The khan khel is the senior, most prestigious sub-tribe found within a Pashtun tribe.

Kundi, and Jaghuri were pacified and left under the control of their own mirs, the elders of the tribe. Before the campaigns of Abdur Rahman, only the Hazaras of south and southeast portion of the Hazarajat, Oruzgan, remained independent.⁹

The Hazaras, like the Pashtuns, had warlike traditions. Muhammad Hyat Khan describes them in 1867, nearly 30 years prior to the war with Abdur Rahman:

“Though no longer carrying on actual hostilities, they have old hatreds with their Uzbek neighbors on the north, and also with the Aimak, and occasional collisions take place. Every adult Hazara has a gun, and may have bows and arrows, a Persian sword, long narrow knife and spear. They are good marksmen, and though quite without any taste for the profession of soldier, fight bravely. Domestic feuds are of constant occurrence, and arise, in great part, from their evil and ungovernable temper, that is ever involving them in difficulty.”¹⁰

Abdur Rahman soon made his move to control the Hazaras by appointing non-Hazara governors, much like Hamid Karzai appointed Jan Mohammad Khan, a Popalzai Durrani Pashtun, in 2001. Mohammad Hussain explains the results of the first time Pashtuns were put in charge of Hazaras:

“In the beginning the Hazaras accepted the central government’s rule and paid their taxes to Kabul, and indeed, some Hazara Mirs (chiefs) were given titles by Abd al-Rahman¹¹. But slowly the latter’s policy toward the Hazaras changed. His governor’s, taking advantage of their position, started abusing their powers and making life difficult for the local population.”

“When the Hazaras complained to Abd al-Rahman about the behavior of one of his governors, he, instead of punishing the official, simply replaced him with another one. When in 1887 the governor of Jaghuri not only insisted on keeping young Hazara girls in his harem against their will, but also married a Hazara woman by force. The Hazaras decided that they would no longer accept the situation.... They were left with no choice except to defend their integrity and pride; therefore a group of them attacked the governor’s residence, released the woman and killed the governor and his clerk.”¹²

Separately, two unfortunate policies were implemented in Kabul about this time that worsened the situation with the Hazaras. The Hanafi interpretation of Islam became the national religion and this led to the suppression of other religious practices – and the Hazaras were mostly Shi’ite. Worse, from the Hazara perspective, the country accepted jihad as a political instrument. Both were to play a devastating role in the Hazara Wars that were rapidly approaching.¹³

Niamanullah Ibrahim explains:

“In his efforts to extend his authority deep into the Hazara’s homeland, the Amir pursued a two-pronged or two-phased strategy. The first prong of the strategy, which dominated his dealings with the Hazaras through the 1880s was to slowly extend his authority through the manipulation of tribal and personal rivalries of the Hazara *khans*. In his first such attempt, in 1881, he invited all Hazara *khans* to Kabul where

9. Kakar, M. Hassan, *The Pacification of the Hazaras of Afghanistan*, Occasional paper #4, Afghanistan Council, The Asia Society, Spring, 1973, pg. 3.

10. Hyat Khan, Muhammad, *Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants*, translated from *Hyat-i-Afghan* by Henry Priestly, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1981, pg. 306.

11. This is a variation of Abdur Rahman’s name.

12. Hussain, Mohammad, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: A Study of Ethnic Relations*, McGill University (thesis), 2003, pg. 29.

13. *Ibid*, pg. 30.

he greeted them with respect, officially confirmed the leadership status of their respective regions and tribes, and secured their support for his government. During the meeting, he emphasised the Islamic bonds between the communities in the country and the need for cooperation between them and Kabul. This provided him an opportunity to establish contacts with an extensive number of Hazara *khans* that were bitterly divided among themselves and disposed for manipulation by external players. Hereby, the Amir centered his efforts on playing one *khan* against the other, mostly supporting the weaker ones in their attempts to challenge the stronger ones. He recruited many *sayeds* (religious figures) and neutralised some *khans* and tribal communities by promising them state support in their local rivalries. The Amir thus also became a source of patronage and support that could alter the balance of power among local players. Rebellious Hazara *khans* were often subjugated by fighters mobilised by other *khans* and Hazara *khans* were required to contribute fighters in similar wars in other regions of the country. For instance, towards the end of the 1880s, several loyal Hazara *khans* and their men fought for the Amir in northern Afghanistan, until then known as Turkistan, in his final attempt to pacify the region.”

“The Amir turned to the second prong of his strategy in the early 1890s when he decided to tighten his grip over the region. At this point the gradual consolidation of his authority through manipulation of local *khans* had reached its ceiling. Many of the local *khans* felt squeezed by the growing and expanding presence and power of the Amir, his demand of total subjugation to his authority, and the excessive taxation and interference in what they considered to be their own domestic affairs. At this point, the Amir was also feeling strong enough to end his dealings with repeated Hazara rebellions. He had gained total control of the Pashtun areas in the south and Turkistan in the north. The tension soon resulted in a series of military attacks and rebellions (1891-1893), which rapidly intensified and escalated into one of the bloodiest conflicts in the country’s history. As a result, the *khans* realised the need for a region-wide collective resistance. In 1892, a meeting occurred that included and represented most of the Hazara *khans*, culminating in a declaration of full war with the aim of overthrowing the monarchy in Kabul. The Amir reciprocated with a similar declaration of war, which was endorsed and propagated by the Sunni clerics against all Hazaras, accusing them of rebellions, heresy, infidelity, and spreading waves of anti-Shiite feelings and hostility across the country. This radically changed the nature of the war and its ultimate goals. Both sides mobilised tens of thousands of fighters on ethnic and religious grounds. While the Hazaras aimed to overthrow the monarch in Kabul, the Amir aimed for a complete end of troubles to his rule caused by the Hazaras. The Amir declared Hazara men and women to be slaves and announced their lands and properties to be rewards for those participating in the war. About one hundred thousand troops and Pashtun tribal armies were mobilised in a military campaign that resulted into mass killing, lootings, displacement and forced subjugation of the Hazaras. The government army and Pashtun tribal militias faced the fiercest resistance in their efforts to enter the region from four directions.”

“Once conquered, the region and its population were treated as infidel land. Despite Abdur Rahman’s claim to be a modernist and a believer in disciplined regular armies, his reliance on tribal levies against the Hazaras came at a price, not only for the Hazaras but also for the plan to create a ‘modern’ Afghanistan. As previously promised by the Amir, everyone involved in the war was allowed to enslave the Hazaras and to seize their property as war booty. By imposing a one-tenth tax on the sale of Hazara slaves and a one-fifth tax on the seizure of their properties, his government effectively turned the Hazaras into subjects of a burgeoning slave trade. Between July 1892 and June 1894 about nine thousand Hazara men and women were sold in the bazaars of Kabul and the government raised seventy thousand rupees as tax on the sale of Hazara slaves in Kandahar alone. The mass killings and enslavement at the hands of the conquerors, coupled with an exodus of locals as a result of persecution and famine followed by the destruction of shelters and agriculture into the then Indian sub-continent, Iran and central Asia, resulted in a considerable reduction in the population and territorial size of the region. Some estimates suggest that the majority of the

region was evacuated. Hazara inhabitants in Oruzgan and districts in today's Zabul province were completely wiped out and instead Pashtuns were settled. In Oruzgan alone, twelve thousand Durrani and four thousand Ghilzai families were ordered to settle on formerly Hazara land. The Behsud, a tribe that is believed to have suffered the least during the war, lost sixty eight percent of its total population."¹⁴

Even this wasn't enough for Abdur Rahman. He was slow to forget his enemies and on February 12, 1895, two years after hostilities with the Hazaras ended, a notice from the palace was read before prayers in Kabul's main mosque. It announced that the Hazaras should not be considered Muslims and should not be left alive, wherever they might be found. Two years after the defeat, Abdur Rahman was still trying to destroy the Hazaras.¹⁵ A more determined enemy would have been hard to find. He initiated his war of extermination against the Hazaras by announcing, in part:

“All of those who have rebelled against me, the Amir of Islam, must be annihilated. Their heads shall be mine; you may have their fortunes and children.”¹⁶

By the end of 1892, the Hazaras were ready to surrender. Abdur Rahman was not in the mood to be generous in the orders he sent to his generals:

“You will do your best to kill and destroy these people so that their name shall not remain within the boundaries of Afghanistan. And the ones who submit to my authority, you should confiscate their arms and punish them accordingly. Remember: do not hesitate to kill and destroy one who resists and rebels.”¹⁷

“Abdur Rahman repeatedly declared that the Hazaras were infidels and that the army and the tribal levies could confiscate captured land, but the actual land was promised only to the Ghilzai and Durrani invaders. He stated that the object of his ordered invasion of Oruzgan was to secure for the Durrani an “an impregnable natural position.”¹⁸

As a result of the invasions, slavery that had been banned was once again flourishing in Afghanistan. The sale of Hazaras was finally banned, but the Hazaras remained slaves until emancipation was ordered by Abdur Rahman's grandson, Amanullah.¹⁹ The liberalizing Amanullah eventually lost his throne as he continued to try to modernize Afghanistan.

The anger of the Shi'a Hazaras persisted, undoubtedly still persecuted by the dominant Sunni Pashtuns. Amanullah's lost throne was held for less than a year by a Tajik before the Pashtuns recovered the control of the monarchy. Nadir Shah, a former general, gained the throne and controlled the numerous ethnic groups with Abdur Rahman's tactics of “divide and rule.” He was later shot dead by a teenager named Abdul Khaliq, a Hazara.

The animosity between the two different ethnic groups continued. The animosity that developed between Afghanistan's Durrani monarchs and Pakistan's rulers over the potential creation of Pashtunistan, a Pashtun homeland that would have been developed at the territorial expense of

14. Ibrahim, Niamatullah, *Divide and Rule: State Penetration in Hazarajat (Afghanistan) from the Monarchy to the Taliban*, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Papers Series 42, London, January 2009. He credits the material to Dawlatabadi 2006: 65-73; Kakar 1973: 135, 137; Temirkhanov 1993: 208; and Farhang 1988: p. 404.

15. Hussain, pg. 31, quoted Asta Olesen's *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, Richmond: Curzon, 1995, pg. 79.

16. *Ibid*, pg. 32.

17. *Ibid*, pg.34.

18. Kakar, M. Hassan, *The Pacification of the Hazaras of Afghanistan*, Occasional Paper #4, Afghanistan Council, The Asia Society, Spring, 1973, pg. 6.

19. *Ibid*, pg. 9.

Pakistan, resulted in a shift in Pashtun Kuchi nomad migration patterns. As Pakistan closed its borders, annual Kuchi migrations stopped movement toward the east and shifted west into Hazara lands where violence often erupted as Hazaras were attacked and murdered by the raiding nomads. The animosity between Pashtun nomads and the settled Hazaras continued to the point that the Karzai Administration created a separate Hazara province, Daikundi, in 2004. The violence and animosity between the Pashtuns and Hazaras continues, however, in the transition zones lying between their adjacent territories.

Conclusions to be drawn from a review of Oruzgan's violent history explain a great deal of the violence seen there now. Successive waves of violent incursions by Pashtun tribes left twelve thousand Durrani and four thousand Ghilzai families in possession of land that once belonged to Hazara families that were killed, enslaved, or driven into exile far from Oruzgan Province. This resulted in the development of unstable transition zones between Pashtun and Hazara enclaves within one another's territory. The creation of these dangerous fault lines, actually broad areas, where the Pashtun tribes overlapped Hazara villages and Durrani overlapped Ghilzai, mistrust and hostility continued over a century to create perhaps the most violent region in Afghanistan. These Pashtuns were of the nang variety, those hill tribesmen with little land of their own and a history filled with stories of raids on their qalang cousins to obtain needed resources. This situation worsened as successive Kabul governments courted the Hazaras in an attempt to draw them toward the urban power centers – at the expense of the nang-oriented tribal traditionalists. It should come as no surprise to learn that over 30 Taliban leaders – and the Afghan Taliban Movement, itself – appears to have originated from Oruzgan Province. These Taliban political leaders and combat commanders were among the most violent, a number that included Mullah Dadullah-Lang, arguably the most dangerous of the Taliban commanders.

Dadullah-Lang's small sub-district area located just to the north of Shadidi Hassas and an area included in today's Daikundi Province due to its majority Hazara population, was the home of four major Taliban commanders: Dadullah-Lang, his brother Bakht Mohammad, Mullah Fazl, and Mohammad Hasan Rahmani. Three of these leaders, all military commanders, Dadullah-Lang, Bakht Mohammad, and Mullah Fazl were all Kakar Pashtuns and originated from the same village. Hasan Rahmani is an Achakzai Zirak Durrani, a tribe that is the mortal enemy of the large number of Noorzai Panjpai Durrani who live in Oruzgan's districts.


The Kakars were the descendents of Kuchi nomads – nang Pashtuns, again – who migrated through southern Hazarajat until Abdur Rahman allowed them to kill off Hazaras and occupy their lands. The Noorzai were Ghilzai Pashtuns who opposed violently the Achakzais who were among the 12,000 Durrani families that followed the Ghilzai into Hazara lands. In this three-way violence that required military skills and alertness that must have verged on paranoia regarding neighboring villages, more animosity than trust developed within the population. It is little wonder that so many Taliban commanders with their followers emerged from the violent “nursery” as the Hazaras leaned instinctively in the opposite political direction, toward the central government where they sought what degrees of safety could be found.

Tribal analysis of the situation helps in understanding how the animosity between the Hazaras and essentially nang Pashtuns. The process continues, however, as Hazaras gravitate toward yet another central government as their nang Pashtun antagonists tend to support the insurgency, if they don't fear their fellow Pashtun neighbors and select a political position opposite them. This normally accounts for some Pashtun groups supporting the government while others are insurgents. This is commonly seen as the Ghilzai and Panjpai Durrani, the generally nang Pashtuns that were involved in the initial invasion ordered by Abdur Rahman, are often Taliban supporters. At the turn of the last century, they destroyed the Hazara inhabitants of the new land they occupied only to be displaced by the larger, more qalang-like Zirak Durrani who are generally government supporters.

TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER

Traditional anthropological research conducted among tribes inhabiting remote areas where insurgents and criminals operate has become increasingly difficult to implement. Studies carried out among people living in small-scale societies now are nearly impossible due to the physical dangers associated with the civil and religious unrest found in those areas. Swat, for example, has become so dangerous that Frederick Barth's studies only could be repeated at the risk of the investigator's life. Similar research is not feasible among Burma's Rohingya tribes located on both sides of the border with Bangladesh, as well as with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan's interior and within Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where even Pakistan's army enters with reluctance.

Given the difficulties of conducting direct fieldwork in conflictive areas, the Tribal Analysis Center utilizes an indirect approach. Using multidisciplinary research, we seek to collect and analyze data obtained from a wide variety of sources, both current and historical. In the absence of new ethnographic fieldwork to update our base of knowledge, the Tribal Analysis Center compiles and summarizes existing research and documents on tribal societies, combining this material with contemporary press reports and articles. We assume that much can be gleaned from well-informed observers who are not anthropologists, ranging from journalists and travelers to government officials.



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